Public Speeches

Australia and the United States: ally and hegemon?

May Day Memorial Lecture, 29 April, 2004

On May Day last year, George W. Bush made a dramatic prime time landing on the deck of the USS Lincoln, looking very much the wartime president. Resplendent in military fatigues and soon posing for photographs in front of a banner declaring 'Mission Accomplished,' President Bush was marking not just what he thought was the end of the war in Iraq, but the beginning of his campaign for re-election.

Twelve months on, post war-Iraq is more dangerous and violent than it was when hostilities were officially underway. As an instigator and minor contributor to the war, the Australian Government must be reflecting, with its senior allies, on what has gone so terribly wrong over the last year. A good starting point would be its changing relationship with the United States.

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In almost all the discussion in this country about the importance of the US alliance, the attitude of the Bush Administration towards America's long-standing friends since the attacks of September 11 2001, has been largely overlooked.

A new approach towards alliances was summarised by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in November 2001, two months after the strikes against New York and Washington: "The mission determines the coalition, not the coalition the mission."

This is not the kind of formulation that dependent allies - states such as Australia which consider themselves incapable of self-defence - wanted to hear at the outset of what has been called "the war on terror." But it may, in part, explain why Canberra has been so keen to pursue the closest possible ties with Washington ever since that fateful day.

Common threats are the glue which maintains the solidarity of alliances, and until September 2001 the post-Cold War world provided little which bound together allies with fading memories of joint wartime struggles in the Pacific and South East Asia. Bonding by exclusion requires a common foe, and none could be easily identified. Until 9/11.

From an Australian perspective, the attacks on New York and Washington, and later in Bali, provided just the kind of adhesion an increasingly anachronistic alliance needed. According to Prime Minister Howard, Islamic militancy seeks "to destroy and debase our way of life" and has targeted the United States and Australia "not because of what we have done, but because of what we believe in and because of who we are." Al Qaeda and its affiliates have "transformed our world" and a "key motivation" of this common threat is its " detestation of western values."

The missing ingredient of the alliance's raison d'etre had been found - at least from Australia's point of view.

From an American perspective, the 9/11 attacks failed to discourage the Bush Administration from its increasingly unilateralist course. This is despite the fact that the strength and influence of the US in the post-WW2 period has to a crucial extent "rested on its ability to convince other nations that it was to their vital interests to see America prevail in its global role" (Gabriel Kolko).

According to one of the world's pre-eminent war historians Gabriel Kolko,

"the Bush Administration, through ineptness and a vague ideology of American power that acknowledges no limits on its global ambitions, and a preference for unilateralist initiatives which discounts consultations with friends much less the United Nations, has seriously eroded the alliance system upon which US foreign policy from 1947 onwards was based." For example:

As a result of Iraq, Bush has alienated "old Europe" and driven France, Russia and Germany together in common opposition to what Kissinger has called the "revolutionary" doctrine of pre-emption;

Since Kosovo NATO has been sidestepped in Afghanistan and Iraq because it is too structurally consultative for Washington's liking;

Washington has antagonised Russia with new military bases on its borders, in the Baltic states and in Central Asia - unsurprisingly Russian military expenditure has tripled under the Bush-Putin relationship;

Bush confronted China, especially over Taiwan before 9/11, and encouraged Beijing to develop multiwarhead missile systems to circumvent Bush's Ballistic Missile Defence program;

Washington's behaviour in Iraq has encouraged Iran and North Korea to develop WMD, knowing that only nuclear weapons are likely to deter the US;

Relations with traditional allies such as Spain, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Canada have been strained by Washington's unilateralist adventure in Iraq and its one-sided support for Israel on the question of Palestine;

Of more pressing concern, the bar to US aggression was further lowered after WMD weren't found in Iraq - henceforth the "intent and ability" to build such weapons is sufficient to justify an attack - this leaves everyone potentially vulnerable because intent is in the eye of the beholder and any school chem lab has the capability to build crude WMD; and

Bush's behaviour has effectively smashed bipartisanship towards the alliance in Australia.

In Canberra, a misguided belief that "everything has changed" since 9/11 has led to a steady departure from strategic self-reliance, diplomatic independence and regional engagement. Instead, the closest possible partnership with Washington has been sought in the belief that only trans-Pacific ties with our great and powerful friend who shares "our values" - can provide a modicum of security in dangerous and uncertain times. From Canberra's perspective, intelligence sharing with the US - despite the WMD debacle - remains the jewel in the alliance crown.

Unsurprisingly, when PM Howard seeks to explain Al Qaeda's motives, he explicitly denies that the United States has ever done anything to cause anti-Western grievances in the Islamic world, and stresses the "common values" of the Pacific partners - a re-writing of history to cement closer ties.

In March 2003 Mr Howard argued that Australia's participation in the war against Iraq was, in part, out of a duty to our alliance partner, even though neither country was under a military threat, imminent or otherwise. This decision was consistent with earlier interventions such as Vietnam, where support for Washington's imperial reach was also assumed to be a necessary downpayment on an insurance policy.

Beyond deep feelings of insecurity and an instinct for bandwaggoning, little thought appears to have been given to the consequences of such unquestioning support for the US - even for its most reckless ventures. Instead, ideological vigilantes on the right insist that it is not possible to criticise the policies of the Bush Administration without being "anti-American." For these commissars - who make no distinction between the American government and American society, it is simply not possible to love Americans and despise the foreign policy that is enacted in their names. This is a replay of the racist slur that one could not criticise Jakarta's behaviour in East Timor without being "anti-Indonesian." In the current climate, the crucial distinction between being anti-American and being un-American has been entirely dissolved.

Despite the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) fiasco and the devastation the "coalition of the willing" has wrought on Iraqi society over the last year, neither the alliance per se nor its recent incarnation as form of vicarious diplomacy, is a matter even for legitimate discussion.

As Alexander Downer admitted in March when discussing the decision to go to war twelve months earlier, "it wasn't a time in our history to have a great and historic breach with the United States." Other allies of the US - Canada, Japan, Germany and Turkey, amongst others, weren't so easily cowed.

Australian foreign policy on a range of issues, including attitudes towards the United Nations, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty, strategic pre-emption and now even gay marriage, to take only five recent examples, are indistinguishable from their American source - dare we say they have been plagiarised?  

This country's diplomacy is now firmly tied to a stridently unilateralist US Administration which, despite multilateral pretences, does not believe in an alliance system that involves genuine consultation. Despite personal friendships, invitations to address the US Congress and Australian Parliament, and a visit to Crawford Texas, Washington's new approach to alliances should trouble Canberra.

As historian Gabriel Kolko argues, "it is simply not to their national interests, much less to their political interests or the security of their people, [for Washington's allies] to pursue foreign policies based on a blind, uncritical acceptance of fictions or flamboyant adventurism premised on false promises and information." For example:

In Iraq no WMD have been found despite there being "no doubts" about their existence, and no Baghdad-Al Qaeda links were discovered - this has led to a collapse of Washington's moral authority amongst its allies;

Previous Western support for Saddam at the peak of his crimes when he was gassing Kurdish villagers and Iranian soldiers is forgotten or stuffed down the memory hole; and

Naïve assumptions about local attitudes to occupation and the spread of democracy in Iraq suggests an inability to see how the occupation looks from the point of view of ordinary Iraqis.

The Madrid bombings in March were a grim reminder of the increasing cost to its allies of following Washington's lead. Support for the Iraq war may not have initially encouraged Islamists to target allied populations, but it has certainly increased their vulnerability to future attacks.

"The United States, to a degree to which it is itself uncertain, needs alliances, but [now] these allies will be bound into uncritical coalitions of the willing" (Gabriel Kolko). However, true alliances are based on consultation and reciprocity. The reckless interventions of the Bush Administration will only be constrained when long-standing allies openly express their concerns and further international isolation is threatened or ensues. Coalitions of the willing, however, are not allowed to raise serious questions about US actions.

There are, therefore, at least five serious dangers in this development for Australia.

The first is Australia's moral complicity in actions it can do little to influence, but for which there are significant consequences. The ethical value of Australia's behaviour in Afghanistan and Iraq will be measured by the predictable consequences of our actions. This extends well beyond the removal of two repressive and unpopular regimes, to include protecting individuals from avoidable harm and the welfare of people we have deprived of government, law and order, as well as basic services such as public health.

Seemingly ambivalent about our role as an occupying power in Iraq, Australia has not fully discharged either its moral or legal responsibilities for nation re-building. Regime change may not have been Canberra's official policy but it was an inevitable product of military intervention in both cases, and Australia must deal with the consequences of it. Our largely token contribution to what is misleadingly called "post-war Iraq" now seems to be more a consequence of domestic politics than international law.

The fact that well over 10,000 innocent civilians (and possibly double that figure) have been killed in Iraq as a consequence of regime change is a responsibility Canberra refuses to even acknowledge let alone share. It is remarkable that Mr Howard is not asked how many dead Iraqi citizens does he believe is a reasonable price for Saddam's removal. The arrival of terrorists, kidnappers and suicide bombers (for the first time since the 13 th century) is a direct result of the coalition's intervention, but is portrayed as some kind of indigenous development for which Washington, London and Canberra bare no responsibility.

A second risk is guilt by association. As Canberra's foreign policy becomes indistinguishable from Washington's, we should expect America's enemies, especially in the Arab and Muslim worlds, to see matters in a similar light. But is it in our national interest to hitch our wagon so closely to the US if it means getting caught up in Washington's blowback? It is still unclear whether Australians were specifically targeted in Bali in October 2002, whether they were mistaken for Americans or victims of a generic anti-Western attack. Policy convergence will ensure that in the future such distinctions will become irrelevant. A more independent stance may not buy us immunity from anti-Western terrorist assaults, but we don't need to conspicuously increase our profile and vulnerability either.

A third problem arising from such a pro-US position is that we will be taken for granted in Washington. Countries which regularly express their fidelity to the United States lose leverage because concurrence with Washington's decisions can be assumed. Allies which play a little harder to get often win significant concessions, as Pakistan and a number of Central Asian states did after September 11. Canada, Turkey and Japan have remained allies with the US even though they initially refused to join the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq. Despite Canberra's assiduous support for Washington over the last three years, the US will not deviate from pursuing its national interests just to reward a junior partner. Even in the current amicable climate it wasn't possible for Canberra to extract a free trade agreement from Washington which required US farmers to compete on a level playing field with their Australian counterparts.

Australia is earning a reputation as Washington's stalking horse, even in countries such as Indonesia and Iran where it is far from clear that our interests and Washington's coincide. But it is not only trade policies which diverge. Australia's slightly more sensible approach to the North Korea problem is having little if any effect on Pentagon planners. Elsewhere in North Asia, Canberra does not want to choose sides in a dispute between the Washington and Beijing over Taiwan. Within a decade China promises to become Australia's largest trading partner. Would this be worth jeopardizing for the sake of the Taiwan lobby in Washington? Co-optation is not in our interests, nor should we become a willing hostage to forces we can barely influence, let alone control.

Is the Australia-US alliance "built on shared values," as Prime Minister Howard claims? We are certainly the only ally in East Asia which identifies culturally with the US. However, it is not clear that Australians would generally embrace the neo-conservatism and Christian fundamentalism which permeates the Bush Administration - even if John Howard, Peter Costello and Governor-General Michael Jeffery do.

Nor are expressions of cultural affinity especially helpful to a policy of regional engagement. Australia's intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq put us at odds with our closest neighbours in South East Asia (Indonesia & Malaysia) just as it did during the Gulf War in 1991, reinforcing a belief that we default strategically to the US in times of global crises. These days, regional engagement looks skin deep, despite recent progress in joining regional fora. We habitually notify the region of decisions we have taken after they have been cleared with Washington. We don't consult them beforehand. South East Asia appears as a source of problems - boat people, Islamic terrorism, military brutality - rather than a region of genuine partnership.

Has Australia's closer relationship with the US since 2001 actually enhanced our security? At a time when the US itself has never been more militarily powerful, it has never felt less secure. This paradox brings little comfort to Australia.

Recent draconian responses to alleged terrorist threats which peel away long-established legal protections and civil liberties, suggest Australians are not seeing the benefits of Washington's security umbrella. Public opinion, particularly after the Bali attack in October 2002, is divided on the virtues of the US alliance and periodically concerned by Washington's aggressive behaviour around the world. Despite Mr Howard's claim that dealing with Iraq was a pre-requisite for reducing the threat posed by other non-conformist states, the invasion of Iraq has almost certainly encouraged other 'rogues' such as Iran and North Korea to acquire or develop the only military technology likely to deter a US strike - nuclear weapons. Encouraging the proliferation of WMD - which was what the Iraq war was supposed to limit - is hardly in Australia's interests.

President Clinton's tardy response to the East Timor crisis in 1999 tapped into subliminal doubts within the Australian community that, despite regular down payments on insurance premiums since the 1950s, the US may be reluctant to pay out when we ultimately make a claim under ANZUS. By any measure, the relationship has been and remains, one-sided.

Washington disregarded institutions of global order and world common good such as the United Nations and international law, once they failed to legitimate an attack on Iraq. This is a regrettable but available option for states which can deploy their raw military power to achieve foreign policy objectives. Why not-so-powerful states such as Australia, which are disproportionately more dependent on the stabilising features of international society, should emulate such behaviour is not obvious. Small and medium powers have a much greater interest in the protections and order afforded by national sovereignty and diplomatic culture. We will not benefit from the damage Washington has inflicted on international society.

Finally, an over-reliance on the personal chemistry between leaders can be intoxicating for those involved but is almost always a short-term benefit. As the Keating-Suharto friendship showed in the 1990s, jointly crafted institutional structures have greater longevity than transient political leaders. If President Bush loses in November or Prime Minister Howard retires from political life some time soon, the current level of goodwill between the political elites of both countries may suddenly pass and relationships will need to be made anew.

Rather than seeking to preserve it in its current form at all costs and dismiss those who want to critically examine it as anti-American, it is prudent and realistic to review the US alliance now before the idea of an independent and self-reliant Australian foreign policy becomes an historical curiosity.

We could do worse than note Gabriel Kolko's observation, based on four decades of historical scholarship into the causes of international conflicts:

"Alliances have been a major cause of wars throughout modern history, removing inhibitions that might otherwise have caused Germany, France and countless nations to reflect much more cautiously before embarking on death and destruction. The dissolution of all alliances is a crucial precondition of a world without wars."

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