Public Speeches

Australia & Asia: Towards New Rules of Engagement

Victorian ADF Health Services Conference, RAAF Williams Laverton, 8-9 April, 2000

This talk will be in three sections. First I will look at the critical themes and issues which determine Australia's relations with Southeast Asia. Secondly, I will say something about the particular mode of thinking which has dominated elite opinion in Australia on the subject in the last 40 years. And finally I will draw some thumb-nail sketches of the current state of Australia's bilateral relationships in the region.

To some, engagement is regarded as a prelude to marriage. To others it describes the moment when armies meet on the battlefield. In the context of Australia's relationship with the region, our engagement with Southeast Asia has recently swung between love and war. Assuming courtship is the preferred approach, there are four areas of Australian diplomacy which require new rules of engagement.

Identity and Difference

Australia has two great advantages at the basis of its regional identity - the secular and multicultural nature of Australian society. In theory we are better prepared for engagement with such a heterogeneous region as East Asia than virtually any other state. And yet we have acted as a natural outsider desperately seeking both a sense of belonging amongst, and acceptance by, our northern neighbours. Few nations spend as much time worrying about how the rest of the world sees us.

Australia should seek to occupy a position between arrogance and deference. We should not boast or lecture others about the superiority of our values.   Nor need we disguise our differences with other countries in the region - this is, in fact, what makes us attractive to them. We certainly need not panic about being "left out" of the region, given that Australia's current exclusion from organisations such as ASEM or ASEAN + 3 is political not cultural. But we can explain the enormous benefits which secularism and multiculturalism confer on those societies which embrace them.

Asia is not a club we need to join. This assumes a homogeneity in the region which doesn't actually exist (Asia is a Western concept). Most clubs have entry qualifications and the implication of this way of thinking is that Australia has an obligation to change or to adjust in some ways in order to find a sense of identity and belonging in the region. The assumptions behind this approach, include an exaggerated sense of cultural separateness and difference - reinforcing an "us" and "them" mindset. Australia must change its predominantly Anglo-Celtic ways - especially its liberal democratic political culture - to "get in". Unsurprisingly, these rules of engagement have not found widespread support in Australia, outside of elite circles. They have often been seen as undignified, even craven and further evidence of our own insecurity and lack of self-respect. What about reciprocity from the region?

This approach is, in my view, largely mystical. A high degree of order and co-operation can exist between states which do not feel they belong to a common civilisation. States with very different cultures and ideologies can come together in a society of states because they share the primary goals of sovereign independence and a belief that international society is the only legitimate form of world political organisation. An open dialogue can bridge many of the differences between nations. Diplomacy should be the means through which the different, the suspicious and even the hostile reach some common ground. Cultural convergence is neither necessary nor desirable, particularly in the current phase of globalisation. Appeasement versus estrangement is a false choice we should not even consider.

The Boundaries of States

The secession and fragmentation of nation-states are not the same thing, though in a sense they are both a normal feature of international life. Just as independence for Tibet would not break-up China, neither would the separation of Aceh or West Papua ineluctably 'Balkanise' Indonesia. The secessionist movements in Indonesia's eastern and western most provinces are largely the creation of Jakarta's military brutality and economic exploitation. The future shape of the republic will depend on whether these citizens still feel their bond with Indonesian nationalism is worth salvaging, and will not be decided by the preferences of neighbours who reflexively favour 'stability' regardless of what is being stabilised.

Canberra's love of regional stability and the status quo assumes an immutability of political boundaries which is historically rare. It may also cause future difficulties elsewhere in the region. Is Australia, for example, opposed to the reunification of the Korean peninsula, or the return of Taiwan to Beijing's sovereign control? Both would involve shifting frontiers. If Mr Downer wants to be on the right side of history he should remember that the politics of contesting and redrawing political boundaries never ends . Sometimes it is a violent process (Yugoslavia 1990s), sometimes it is negotiated (Norway/Sweden (1905), UK/Irish Free State (1921), Malaysia/Singapore (1965), East & West Germany (1989), Czechoslovakia (1993)), sometimes it's a combination of both (USSR (1990)).

We have to deal with the process of how quickly newly drawn boundaries become 'sacred' and 'non-negotiable' - how modern traditions and feelings about homelands are invented for political purposes (eg the shape of Indonesia modeled on the hated Dutch East Indies). And when we contemplate the levels of destruction and human suffering that have resulted from the defence of existing territorial boundaries, it might be prudent for leaders to adopt a more open-minded approach to territoriality than is their custom. National self-determination is not necessarily a once-and-for-all event at the time of decolonisation. We should not make the mistake of equating stability with the status quo (Indonesia needed a revolution to gain its independence).

It is one of the paradoxes of Australian political culture that those who embrace economic globalisation and the importance of economic reform and change are so inherently frightened of changes to the territorial boundaries of states, despite the lessons that history teaches us.

Political Culture

As democratic rule takes root in the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan, the opportunities for deeper engagement with the region increase. Australia should explicitly encourage these and other democratic transitions, while recognising that they require a change of political culture as much as they do the holding of free and fair elections. Pre-requisites for democracy include civilian control of the military and restrictions on any internal role for the armed forces. Neither of these conditions exist in Burma or Indonesia (or Pakistan), which will limit the potential for closer relations with these states. No one should be surprised by this (eg Downer's remarks about living next door to a democracy on the eve of Indonesia's most recent parliamentary elections).

Australia will have a closer and deeper relationship with democratic states than it will with authoritarian ones. And the trends (democratisation and the civilianisation of politics) are moving in our favour.

Nevertheless, Australia needs to open up its foreign policy making process to higher levels of popular participation and awareness so that public confidence can be increased. The gap between elite and popular perceptions of Australian diplomacy (eg the 1995 Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement) needs to be closed. After all, only popular consent and consultation confers legitimacy on government policy. Diplomatic relationships should be built on institutions and processes, as much as individual personalities. Too many bilateral relationships are only seen through the prism of transitory leaders.

Human rights concerns should contextualise Australia's regional diplomacy rather than appear as an agenda item in ministerial meetings. We must await systemic and leadership changes in China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia before warmer bilateral relations ensue. Diplomatic choices are rarely as stark as love or estrangement, but almost always fall somewhere in between. We should use more carrots and fewer sticks in our approach to human rights in the region - emphasise the advantages of adherence to universal standards of behaviour and the benefits of democracy, rather than stress the penalties for non-compliance.

Commerce & Globalisation

Discussion about a possible bilateral trade agreement with the US and efforts to kick start a new WTO round, should remind us of the essential political and economic functions which states perform. The state continues to play a critical role in capital accumulation, especially in so called 'free market economies'. Far from being of marginal relevance to global commerce as the cheerleaders for globalisation suggest, the nation-state has the exclusive authority to both forge and bind the whole community to international trade and financial agreements. The ongoing quest for export markets in East Asia and the need to source students, tourists and foreign investment from the region will therefore continue to be a primary responsibility of governments in Canberra.

And yet people are extremely anxious about the loss of their personal economic sovereignty and the growing democratic deficit between corporate power and accountability, hence the proliferation of Seattle-style popular protests - evidence of a widespread backlash against globalisation. The price of economic interdependence is rarely explained or even conceded, hence popular suspicion about the virtues of 'free trade'.

Australia's economic diplomacy, however, will continue to be conducted bilaterally and through regional fora. Though both APEC (too big - 21 members) and ASEAN (10 members, consensus problem) seem to be in decline, the ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China, South Korea) group which links North-East and South-East Asia economies together, may well design the blueprint for trade and financial co-operation in the region. Canberra should seek to make the organisation as inclusive as possible and join it, though there is no cause for panic about our current exclusion - on political grounds - by Malaysia and Indonesia.

The establishment of Australia's most important trade relationship with Japan in the 1950s and the immunity of our economic ties with Indonesia from events in East Timor during 1999, remind us again of capitalism's own internal logic. Business is business. The expansion of Australia's economic links with the region depends, not on our perceived cultural identity, shared values or even friendships, but on our industrial relevance and preparedness for co-operation. Australia's assistance to regional economies during the Asian economic crisis (watering down the IMF rescue package for Indonesia, assistance to Thailand, etc) was appreciated and remains a tangible example of regional economic co-operation. More, in a similar vein, could be done for Indonesia.

The Problems with Approaches to Asia

I will use the example of Indonesia as broadly illustrative of a broader problem. Until 1998, academic and diplomatic strategies towards Indonesia, were based on two premises:

a) Australia was more likely to have influence over the government of Indonesia if we are considered friendly, sympathetic and supportive;

b) the collapse of the Suharto government would bring chaos and instability in the region and the prospect of an increase in the power and influence of fundamentalist Islam.

According to adherents of this approach, these goals have been periodically thwarted by Australian insensitivity to Indonesian culture, ideological antipathy, irrational fears about Indonesia - combined with traditional Australian arrogance, racism and ignorance. We have been preoccupied with human rights in East Timor and West Papua. And we have not been sufficiently aware of the enormous challenges facing Indonesia's rulers, both in keeping the state together and in developing its economy. Nor have we tried to understand the different perspectives and values which inform Indonesian attitudes and behaviour. Too often Australia seeks to impose its Western values on Indonesia - especially in the area of procedural freedoms (democracy and human rights).

According to this approach, Indonesian political culture is different to ours. And our judgement of it is rooted in the values and assumptions of our own political culture. Indonesians, as a consequence of enduring cultural characteristics, have an elliptical style of communication as opposed to the directness of the West. Indonesians are uncomfortable with democracy and prefer strong rule to fit their dependent personalities and unitary political needs.

Perhaps the best known manifestation of this arguments centres on the question of Asian values .

The suggestion that the Western path to modernity will eventually command universal consent, or that there is even a universally agreed definition of democracy, has always been somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, liberals such as Francis Fukuyama have claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s proves that liberal democracy has no serious ideological competitor: it is "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government". Furthermore, the end of the Cold War represents the triumph of the "ideal state" and a particular form of political economy, "liberal capitalism", which "cannot be improved upon". According to Fukuyama, there can be "no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions". The end of the East-West conflict confirms that liberal capitalism is now unchallenged as a model of, and endpoint for, humankind's political and economic development.

The West has little difficulty in defining democracy in procedural terms where the citizens of a state can meaningfully participate in political decisions which affect their lives. This usually takes the form of representative democracy expressed in institutional form after free and fair elections. Universal suffrage and freedom of conscience, speech, association, assembly and the press are considered the normal ingredients of a democratic political culture. Organised and permanent political opposition is also regarded as both a legitimate and necessary activity in a healthy democracy.

This definition of democracy, however, is under serious challenge from a number of increasingly self-confident East Asian societies which question the cultural relevance of Western-style liberal democracy. Although frequently cast in terms of 'Asian values' by right-wing leaders seeking to undermine their domestic political opponents, concerns about human rights and democracy in East Asia should be understood as a rejection of the liberal argument that Western path to modernity is universally valid or that political development always terminates at liberal democracy. There is therefore some merit to the claim that the West's political and human rights agenda in East Asia is a thinly disguised form of cultural imperialism which attempts to thwart the comparative economic advantages of states in the region.

However, as Richard Robison says, "by claiming an immutable and discrete Asian set of values, conservative leaders are able to deny legitimacy to domestic opponents, who can be dismissed as opposing the national interest or simply being un-Asian". These same leaders also arrogate the custodial right to decide what is 'Asian' and what is 'Western'. The notion that Asians are uniformly and culturally different provides authoritarian leaders in East Asia with a powerful rationale for double standards on human rights, freedom of expression and other universal standards of behaviour. The claim that Asians as an homogenous group have different human values from the rest of the world - and even the proposition that values are culturally specific - is a difficult one to sustain.

Is there cultural commonality across such a diverse region?

It is also paradoxical that the basic procedural freedoms and rights which citizens in liberal democracies take for granted, including freedom of association, the right to organise and collectively bargain, the right to work in a safe environment, the prevention of forced labour, etc, are being eroded and denied in a number of developing East Asian societies by policies of market liberalisation which Western elites are encouraging. Industrial accidents due to poor or non existent safety standards are commonplace in China and Thailand. Trade unionists have been threatened, attacked, arrested and murdered in Indonesia. Workers' rights in Malaysia and Singapore are denied in the interests of 'economic development'. Child labour is exploited in South Korea and China. Attempts by the Clinton Administration to draw attention to these abuses were condemned by other liberal governments, such as Australia's, which seem more enamoured with the ideology of free trade and concerned by any threats to the region's so called 'comparative advantage' in cheap labour.

The problem with this argument is that the link between workers' rights and free trade is made by the East Asian governments themselves. When the Indonesian Government, for example, kept wages in that country artificially low by outlawing freedom of association, banning independent trade unions, arresting, incarcerating and sometimes murdering labour activists, it explicitly violating free market principles. This policy is really an example of state intervention lowering the price of labour, thus providing a hospitable climate for transnational capital - a sharp departure from the neo-liberal doctrines so favoured by policy elites in the West. Labour markets in East Asia are anything but free.

Nevertheless, the region has demonstrated that the absence of Western-style democracy is certainly no impediment to international competitiveness.

Despite the claim of conservatives that the new middle classes of the developing world will demand commensurate political influence in the affairs of state, there is little evidence of a link between economic and political liberalisation. China, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, for example, have shown that rapid economic development can be achieved with few concessions to the democratic freedoms familiar in the West. In fact they openly suggest that social justice and democracy are actually incompatible with economic growth and international competitiveness. In this claim they are supported by neo-liberal economists in the West who seem more concerned with the adoption of free trade and the de-regulation of the finance sector than they are with the spread of democracy. In some quarters democracy is considered dysfunctional and 'inefficient', and must therefore be restricted in 'the national interest', usually defined in elite terms.

A related argument, that 'rice must come before rights' - that economic, social and cultural rights should precede civil and political rights - has been made by a number of East Asian governments, most explicitly in the Bangkok Declaration from the Asia- Pacific Conference on Human Rights in March/April 1993. It implies that poverty alleviation and economic development in these societies depends on the denial of political freedoms and human rights to their citizens. However, the claim that rights can be prioritised in this way or that procedural and substantive freedoms are incompatible is highly problematic and widely seen, with justification, as a rationalisation by governments for non-democratic political processes. The 'exclusivist' argument which privileges economic, social and cultural rights is a direct challenge to the idea that human rights are indivisible and universal.

An increasing number of conservative political leaders in East Asian have also argued that there is a superior Asian model of political and social organisation comprising the principles of harmony, hierarchy and consensus (Confucianism) in contrast to what they regard as the confrontation, individualism and moral decay which characterises Western liberalism. Regardless of how self-serving this argument is (in fact it has been rejected by the South Korean president) - and it is never offered by democratically elected rulers - it poses a fundamental challenge to Fukuyama's suggestion that in the post-Cold War period liberal democracy has no serious ideological competitors. It is clear that many states in East Asia are not striving to imitate the Western route to political modernisation.

Isn't this argument culturally relativist? Doesn't it provide governments, such as Indonesia's, with immunity from criticism for their suppression of procedural freedoms. All societies and their cultures have validity and legitimacy, and are therefore immune from external criticism. There are no universal measures, only culture-based judgements.

How do we explain this approach, which has been extremely influential, both in Australia's academic and policy-making circles? Perhaps it is a consequence of the continuing influence of Orientalism - a dominant theme in Western analysis and representation of the East which reduces Eastern societies to a series of timeless, immutable and monolithic cultures. Culture is used as an explanatory tool in a manner never used to analyse Western societies, which are considered to be more complex, political, material and dynamic. Whereas the West is understood through its history, the East is understood through its culture.

The task for Orientalists is to uncover the deep significance of Asian culture in the understanding of Asian politics and therefore explain and direct how the West should engage Asia - an essentialist approach (Asia is a coherent, homogenous entity)

There are serious problems with Orientalist approaches.

They help to reinforce and reproduce notional differences between the Orient and the Occident - differences that may well be illusory or simply artificially constructed by the West for its own purposes.

Orientalist approaches confuse the notion of 'culture' with the specific ideological expression of the social, political and economic interests of the ruling elite. A conflation, for example, of the culture of Indonesia and the culture of authoritarianism. It's an ideology happy to stress harmony, obedience, hierarchy, conformity and the avoidance of conflict.

But it fails to identify the diversity of interests and ideologies which exist in Asian countries such as Indonesia. Harmony and order yes, but conflict and opposition also. Islam, revolution, secular nationalism live side by side in Indonesia. The mistake is to accept an 'idealised' notion of Indonesian culture.

Residual Orientalism, perhaps best illustrated by the Jakarta lobby in Australia, has had a remarkably influential and distorting effect on policy and scholarship. A new mode of Asian engagement for Australia will need to shrug off its intellectual straightjacket.

Thumb-Nail Sketches

Malaysia - suspended animation, pending Mahathir's departure, routine anti-Australianism (post-Mahathir?), natural economic rival

Burma - similar, in abeyance pending a regime change, what to do with Aung San Suu Kyi?

Singapore - commercially strong - impending FTA, strategically less important - though FPDA, strong political support for Australia but lacks regional influence

PNG - fraught by economic mismanagement, squandering resources, aid dependent, a struggling transplanted political culture, West Papua, PNGDF

Indonesia - troubled by weak leadership, intractable economic problems, rampant corruption, centrifugal fragmentation - responses to separatism, irrational anti-Australianism (East Timor), the possibility of a reversion to New Order-style authoritarianism, rather than democracy

East Timor - aid dependent (lion's share of oil & gas revenues), strategically vulnerable post UN withdrawal, uncertain relations with a Megawati presidency, potential to trouble Australia-Indonesia relationship

Thailand - tension between monarchy and democracy, supportive of Australian entry to ASEM and ASEAN + 3, closest regional partner (East Timor)

China - behaviour towards Taiwan may encourage Washington and possibly Beijing to force Australia to choose between the US and China - a choice it never wants to make

Philippines - corruption by leaders

Readings

Richard Robinson, Pathways to Asia (Allen & Unwin, St Leonards 1996)

Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons (Verso, London 1998)

Scott Burchill, 'Howard's Asian Stand-Off', AQ: Journal of Contemporary Analysis , Vol 72, Issue 3, June-July 2000.

Damien Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Political Profile (OUP, Melbourne 2001).

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